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Japan Report

(FOUO 66/81)



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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SUZUKI PLANS RESHUFFLE IN PARTY LINEUP

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 26 Oct 81 p 1

[Article by Yamato Ishigami]

[Text] Portland, Oregon--Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki told the Japanese press here Saturday that he intends to carry out a major reshuffle of the top officials of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party in late November in a move to promote younger LDP members.

The terms of party executives will expire on Nov 27 and, Suzuki said, this provides a good time to form a new party leadership.

He also said that the current Diet session will be over by that date, indicating that he will carry out the reshuffle around Nov 27.

In the formation of the new party echelon, Suzuki said he will put top priority on the promotion of younger members of the LDP.

This remark can be translated that the prime minister intends to give a chance to politically young LDP leaders, such as Kiichi Miyazawa, Michio Watanabe, Noboru Takeshita, and Ichiro Nakagawa, who have not held party executive posts.

Suzuki met the press here on his way home from Cancun, Mexico, where he attended the North-South summit conference Thursday and Friday.

On the cabinet reshuffle, which is also expected to come in November, Suzuki said it does not have to be directly linked with the change in LDP executives.

"Frankly, both the party and the cabinet are doing quite well, much better than expected, and there are few waves in the party," Suzuki told the press.

It is not clear why the prime minister wants to separate the LDP executive reshuffle and that of cabinet members.

Most political observers say Suzuki believes any reference to the cabinet reshuffle at this moment would irritate opposition parties and hinder passage of the administrative reform bills which Suzuki is pushing through the current Diet session.

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But the observers say the reshuffle of party executives and the cabinet changes are closely linked and that they will most probably come at the same time.

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- Despite the prime minister's cautious wording, the observers say, his press remarks will accelerate the moves of the party factions toward the reshuffles.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

CABINET RESHUFFLE EXPECTED IN LATE NOVEMBER

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 25 Oct 81 p 2

["Political Periscope" column by Takuo Hayashi]

[Text]

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki will carry out a cabinet reshuffle sometime late in November after the end of the current Diet session which was convened to deliberate on administrative reform.

The prime minister of Japan usually reshuffles his cabinet after an interval of about one year. In other words, the tenure of cabinet ministers is, as a matter of principle, only a year.

While the number of cabinet posts is limited, there are all too many Diet members of the government party pining for one. Such a bad practice has come about just to satisfy their desire.

The tenures of the Liberal-Democratic Party's executives including the so-called "Three Party Executives," that is, the party secretary general, chairman of the Executive Council and chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, are to expire at the end of November. Capitalizing on the opportunity, Prime Minister Suzuki hopes to carry out the reshuffling of both the LDP executives and his cabinet. The personnel problem centering on the reshuffle is now the focal point of intra-party interest.

The number of cabinet ministers, except for the prime minister, is 20. The faction-wise rundown of the present cabinet is as follows: Suzuki faction, Takeo Fukuda faction, and Kakuei Tanaka faction, four each; Yasuhiro Nakasone faction and Toshio Komoto

faction, two each; Ichiro Nakagawa group, one; and three others affiliated with no particular factions.

There are seven important cabinet ministers including Director General Nakasone of the Administrative Management Agency who heads the Nakasone faction, Director General Komoto of the Economic Planning Agency who heads the Komoto faction; Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa and Minister of International Trade and Industry Rokusuke Tanaka who belong to the Suzuki faction; Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda and Finance Minister Michio Watanabe who are nonfaction members, and Director-General Nakagawa of the Science and Technology Agency who is the head of the Nakagawa group.

Many To Remain

It is most unlikely that of the 20 cabinet members excluding those top seven the remaining 13 "nonimportant cabinet members" will remain in office. Of the seven, it is believed almost certain that Director General Nakasone of the Administrative Management Agency will remain in the reshuffled cabinet. Although there is a possibility that Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa may become the chairman of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council, he is more likely to remain in the present post. Minister of International

Trade and Industry Tanaka is unlikely stay in the cabinet, but he may sideslip into the chairmanship of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council. There is no possibility for Director General Nakagawa of the Science and Technology Agency to remain in office, because he believes he should not block the road to the only ministerial post which is the vested interest of the Nakagawa group.

Attention is then focused on whether or not the remaining three important cabinet members, Director General Komoto of the Economic Planning Agency, Foreign Minister Sonoda and Finance Minister Watanabe will remain in office. Of the three, it is speculated that Komoto may leave the cabinet. The speculation is based on the following two grounds: In the first place, Komoto plans, like Director General Nakasone of the Administrative Management Agency, to run in the next LDP presidential election to be held in November next year. While Nakasone hopes to strengthen his footing for the next presidential election by remaining in the cabinet, Komoto believes it is advantageous for him to secure his freedom of activities by leaving the cabinet. Secondly, if he remains in the office, one of the two ministerial posts earmarked for his faction will be occupied by him.

It appears, however, that the

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Suzuki faction led by Prime Minister Suzuki is not desirous of Komoto quitting the cabinet. for his departure means the emergence of an open rival influence. Perhaps Prime Minister Suzuki will call on Komoto to stay on. In that case, how will Komoto react?

There is little doubt that both Foreign Minister Sonoda and Finance Minister Watanabe are hoping to stay in office. But no one can say for sure if their hope will come true. It is also believed certain that of the three party executives, Secretary General Yoshio Sakurauchi and Chairman Shintaro Abe of the Policy Affairs Research Council will be offered important cabinet posts, probably as a token of their services. And then, Sakurauchi may be offered the post of either minister of

finance or that of the minister of international trade and industry while it is speculated that Abe may be offered the post of foreign minister or finance minister. There is also a possibility that Chairman Susumu Nikaido of the Executive Council may become the party secretary general or may remain in the present post. If not, observers say, Nikaido may take a seat in the cabinet like Sakurauchi and Abe and his post will be that of the foreign minister.

In this regard, as far as the post of the foreign minister is concerned, we can think of three alternative cases: that Sonoda will remain in office, or that Abe or Nikaido will be chosen for the post. Attention is thus focused on what choice Prime Minister Suzuki will make.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

RESHUFFLING OF SUZUKI CABINET, LDP LEADERSHIP ANTICIPATED

Tokyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English 27 Oct 81 p 10

[Editorial: "Maneuvers Are Set for Cabinet Reshuffle"]

[Text]

There have been considerable maneuvers among ruling Liberal Democratic Party factions recently toward the anticipated reshuffle of the Suzuki Cabinet and the LDP leadership in late November. In the ruling LDP, three main posts of secretary-general, executive policy chairman and policy affairs research council chairman occupy the leadership and run day-to-day party affairs under the president. Thus all factions of the LDP are always vying to get any one of those three posts, and LDP President and Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki will worry most over who to choose for those posts in an attempt to maintain a precarious factional balance within the party. Close associates of Prime Minister Suzuki have revealed a scheme to fill those key posts with members of mainstream Suzuki, Tanaka and Fukuda factions, but behind this scheme lies their shrewd calculation for Suzuki to win reelection as LDP president next fall.

Right after the sudden death of former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira last year, Suzuki was elected to the premier's post for the simple reason that he belonged to the Ohira faction and filled his Cabinet posts with members for all factions within the party, thereby placing himself in a very advantageous position with no anti-mainstream factions opposing him. Accordingly, unless he makes a serious blunder, all indications are that Suzuki will be reelected to the LDP presidency next year. So there are two noteworthy points in the coming reshuffle: whether Prime Minister Suzuki can form a framework conducive to his reelection as party president and what will happen to the factional balance within the LDP.

Firstly, the fundamental strategy of the Suzuki Faction toward the reshuffles is to form a framework conducive to Suzuki's reelection. At present, three key LDP posts are occupied by respective members of Nakasone, Tanaka and Fukuda Factions and the Suzuki Faction would like to grab any one of three posts by all means. Under their scheme, the Suzuki Faction intends to place its senior member Kunikichi Saito, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Rokusuke Tanaka in any key posts of the cabinet and the LDP in an attempt to maintain the Suzuki Administration in the years to come. For the Suzuki Faction, it will be troublesome to decide what to do with Miyazawa and Tanaka in the coming reshuffle because the question of who to succeed Suzuki is involved. But for the post of LDP secretary-general, Suzuki Faction members reportedly recommended Saito or Heiji Ogawa, both senior members of the faction.

Secondly, both Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda, former prime ministers and faction leaders, are extremely influential with Prime Minister Suzuki. The Tanaka Faction aims at putting Executive Council Chairman Susumu Nikaido in the post of secretary-general and winning one more ministerial post in the coming reshuffle. The Tanaka Faction sees the coming reshuffle as a golden opportunity to realize "Secretary-General Nikaido" because no one else in the Suzuki and Fukuda factions will be suited to the job. Behind their request for one more cabinet post lies the fact that the Tanaka Faction members now total 104 and many of their senior members are on the waiting list for ministerial posts.

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On the other hand, the Fukuda Faction is vying to put Policy Affairs Research Council Shintaro Abe in the key cabinet post with either a foreign or finance portfolio, and their man in any one of three main LDP posts. Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda used to belong to the Fukuda Faction, but is separated from Fukuda at present.

The biggest focal point in the reshuffle will be what will happen to Yasuhiro Nakasone, director-general of the Administrative Management Agency and Toshio Komoto, director-general of the Economic Planning Agency, both of them declared contenders for the premiership. Nakasone is ready to stay at his own post if Prime Minister Suzuki asks him to do when he said "unless the premier mentions otherwise, I will devote myself to the work of administrative reform." For Nakasone, it will be impossible to reject Suzuki's any request because he cannot get the premiership unless he gets a support from both the Suzuki and Tanaka Factions. But the biggest headache for Nakasone

is whether he can put a new man in a cabinet post. If leaders of his faction occupy allotted party and cabinet posts, Nakasone will be confronted with increasing criticisms from young members, especially, of his faction. Furthermore, Finance Minister Michio Watanabe bolted from the Nakasone Faction last year and formed his own faction recently.

Meanwhile, there have been rumors that Komoto might step down from any posts because he repeatedly made remarks "independently" on administrative reform and tax reduction. Mainstream faction members estimate that Komoto will soon or later leave the Suzuki Cabinet in an attempt to launch a campaign against Suzuki. But Komoto himself dismisses those rumors with a laugh and political observers say that if Komoto steps down at this time, his existence will be shadowed. But some young members of Komoto's faction complain that there are only two cabinet posts allotted to the faction and that if Komoto steps down, it will be easier for some other members of his faction on the waiting list to get a cabinet post.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

NEW HEADACHE FOR SUZUKI REPORTED

Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 22 Oct 81 p 2

[Politics Today--and Tomorrow column by Minoru Shimizu: "New Headache for Suzuki"]

[Text] Although the Diet has yet to reach the halfway mark in its discussions of the bills related to administrative reform, on which Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is staking his political life, most members of the ruling party have recently started focusing their attention on a different issue.

This issue is the reshuffle of Cabinet members and party executives scheduled to take place at the end of November following the close of the extraordinary Diet session.

The reason why the Diet members of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) have already turned their attention to the November reshuffle is that the administrative reform debates are proceeding smoothly and there are good prospects that the related bills will pass the current Diet.

According to observers, Prime Minister Suzuki himself is now confident of being able to weather the Diet session. However, he reportedly told his aides that he is extremely worried about next month's Cabinet reshuffle.

Observers interpret the fact that Suzuki is now making the Cabinet reshuffle his main concern as meaning that he is no longer worried about the current progress of business in the Diet.

Prime Minister Suzuki, who unexpectedly took over the government in July last year, has substantially maintained the same Cabinet and party executive lineup since the start of his administration. According to past practice, a Cabinet reshuffle has taken place roughly once every year, which means that most members of the present Cabinet have been in office several months longer than usual (although there have been changes in foreign affairs, health and welfare, and home affairs ministers).

Strengthen Position

As the power to appoint ministers rests with the prime minister, past prime ministers have endeavored to manipulate the party and thereby stabilize and strengthen their position within the party by taking advantage of Cabinet reshuffles. Prime Minister Suzuki is no exception and has told his aides that "consideration of a person's merits will probably depend on his activities in the current Diet."

One reason why the Diet debates on the administrative reform bills are progressing according to the government and LDP schedule is that LDP Diet members hoping for Cabinet posts are actively cooperating in the Diet proceedings. In other

words, they have taken the prime minister's words at their face value and are acting accordingly.

However, former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka once said: "Depending on how they are carried out, Cabinet reshuffles can sometimes shorten the life of an administration instead of lengthening it. This is because, in carrying out a reshuffle, one may make many enemies instead of increasing the number of one's supporters."

Only 20 Cabinet Posts

Excluding the prime minister, there are only 20 Cabinet posts. Thus Tanaka implied that, although the few lucky persons who were appointed to the Cabinet could be relied upon to support and cooperate with the prime minister, there would probably be a far greater number disappointed in their hopes and these might well harbor resentment toward the prime minister.

Observers say that when the prime minister lacks strong leadership, a personnel reshuffle further exposes his deficiency of political power. Looking back on Suzuki's political performance over the past year and several months, one cannot say that he is a prime minister possessing strong political leadership.

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Accordingly, the personnel reshuffle that Suzuki plans to carry out in November is fraught with many difficult problems. Unless he is able to solve these problems when reshuffling his Cabinet, his administration is likely to become more unstable than before.

Following is a brief rundown on some of these problems:

1. Is the present mainstream group setup based on the Suzuki, Tanaka and Fukuda factions to be maintained?

2. What is to be done about the top three party executive posts, especially that of secretary-general?

3. Should he retain Yasuhiro Nakasone, director general of the Administrative Management Agency, and Toshio Komoto, director general of the Economic Planning Agency, both of whom are powerful candidates for the premiership in succession to Suzuki?

4. What should he do with Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda and Finance Minister Michio Watanabe?

5. Should the number of Cabinet posts allotted to the Tanaka faction, the largest of the LDP factions with 104 members, be increased from four to five? And how should he deal with Susumu Nikaido, chairman of the LDP's Executive Council and the Tanaka faction's representative?

6. How should he treat Kiichi Miyazawa, chief Cabinet secretary, and Rokusuke Tanaka, minister of international trade and industry, who, though executives of the Suzuki faction, are on bad terms with the prime minister?

All these problems being interrelated, they cannot be handled separately, which makes the whole business very ticklish and complicated.

Matter of Nikaido

Let us consider, for instance, the matter of how Nikaido should be treated. The Tanaka faction wants to run one of its members in the party presidential election in autumn next year and is considering Nikaido, the faction's representative, as its candidate. Because Nikaido has been regarded as one of the "gray officials" involved in the Lockheed scandal, both he and the Tanaka faction as a whole have been doing their utmost to dispel this image.

This unfavorable image was said to have become much diluted when Nikaido became chairman of the Executive Council at the start of the Suzuki administration, but his supporters hope to erase it altogether in the forthcoming Cabinet reshuffle. Thus, Nikaido is hoping to get the post of party secretary-general with the powerful backing of the so-called "Tanaka corps." In the event that this proves difficult, he intends to ask to be kept in his present Executive Council post or to be given the position of foreign minister.

The Fukuda faction, which also belongs to the mainstream group, is not likely to agree to Nikaido's appointment to the post of secretary-general. The present secretary-general, Yoshio Sakurachi, is a member of the Nakasone faction.

Suzuki himself would probably prefer to appoint a secretary-general from his own faction rather than Nikaido in order to see himself safely through the remainder of his term as party president until next autumn when he aims to stand for re-election.

Post of Foreign Minister

Nikaido has made frequent trips to the United States and

Europe during the past year or so and has shown strong interest in international affairs. Accordingly, he is attracted to the post of foreign minister. If he is given this post, it will mean changing places with Foreign Minister Sonoda, with whom Prime Minister Suzuki has a close relationship. Sonoda wants to keep his present position or to be given one of the three top party posts.

If Nikaido fails to get the sort of post he wants, the large Tanaka faction would no doubt turn against Prime Minister Suzuki. Suzuki needs the cooperation of the Tanaka faction to ensure the stability of his administration, but if, in order to retain its support, he gives Nikaido a post which would put him in an advantageous position he runs the risk of having Nikaido compete against him in the presidential race next year, thereby jeopardizing his chances of re-election.

The Nikaido question is related to problems 1, 2, 4 and 5 listed above.

Prime Minister Suzuki hopes to carry out the November reshuffle in such a way as to enable him to gain re-election in the LDP presidential race next year. On the other hand, there has arisen an opinion in some quarters of the LDP that he has no chance of re-election. And some members of groups supporting rival candidates for the next premiership are planning moves to obstruct Suzuki's re-election by taking advantage of the forthcoming reshuffle. Against this background the Cabinet reshuffle is likely to prove a major headache for the prime minister.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

DELICATE SITUATION MAKES SUZUKI CAUTIOUS ABOUT VISITING MIDEAST

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Nov 81 p 1

[Text]

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is now very cautious about making a visit to the Middle East early next year, despite the fact that he has been showing great enthusiasm about making one in the past month.

New developments in the Middle East and domestic politics have made him change his mind.

Since assuming office, Suzuki has visited Southeast Asia, the United States and Western Europe and attended summits in Ottawa and Mexico, and, excluding South Korea and China, the place he should go to next in the current international economic and political circumstances is the Middle East. After the death of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the visit to Japan of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, a concrete plan was discussed.

Suzuki became enthusiastic after he was urged to visit the Middle East by Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda on his return from a trip to Cairo to attend Sadat's funeral, and it appeared almost certain that the Prime Minister would fly to the Middle East as early as next January.

Nevertheless, after the North-South summit in Cancun, Mexico, Suzuki changed his attitude.

One of the views current within the Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) is that Suzuki

sensed that people within the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party and the Government were not altogether happy about his making the visit.

Though the Government's acceptance of Arafat's visit was praised as a new approach, many people in the LDP and Government feel that Japan should not try to take the initiative in settling problems in the Middle East since the political situation there is extremely complex and what Japan can do is very limited.

Another factor is that it is difficult to predict what will happen in the Middle East after Hosni Mubarak's succession to the Egyptian presidency and the U.S. sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia.

On the domestic political scene, a Cabinet reshuffle is expected soon. Sonoda is under increasing fire for his management of Japan's foreign policy within the LDP, and if Suzuki decides on an early Middle East trip, it may be taken to mean that Sonoda will retain his present post in a reshuffled Cabinet.

However, the Gaimusho thinks that, when Saudi Arabia's Prince Fahd visits here in early December, Suzuki will have to give a date for his return visit to Riyadh. The Gaimusho still hopes that the Prime Minister will make the trip in January.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

IMPLICATIONS OF TANAKA-FUKUDA MEETING VIEWED

Tokyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English 27 Oct 81 p 10

[Text] The news that former prime ministers Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda totally unexpectedly met over lunch at a restaurant in Tokyo last Friday caused considerable stirrings within the Liberal Democratic Party.

And this is no wonder for a few reasons. First, they are the two strongmen who virtually keep the incumbent Zenko Suzuki Government afloat. But, second, they have been at odds with each other and have never met in private in the past five years since their confrontation over Tanaka's implication in the Lockheed scandal. Third, in connection with the second reason, what made their meeting all the more controversial and a target of speculation and suspicion is the impending reshuffle for the Suzuki Cabinet scheduled for next month.

Emerging from the meeting, which lasted for half an hour or so, both Tanaka and Fukuda in a good mood stressed the casual nature of the occasion. But however much they denied anything serious about it, it was enough to arouse various factions and worry particularly the faction led by Suzuki himself. For Suzuki's staying in office is based on a [word illegible] balancing act between Tanaka and Fukuda factions, the two power centers within the ruling party. Direct dealing between the two men could seriously affect this balancing act. For one thing, closer ties between the two strongmen will provide them with increased influence over intra-party affairs and power broking.

As one party insider put it, the fact that the Tanaka-Fukuda meeting took place while Suzuki was away attending the North-South summit in Mexico could [words illegible] than a coincident [words illegible].

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U.S. EFFORTS TO FORCE INCREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING CRITICIZED

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 3 Nov 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text]

Two attempts in the US Congress to force Japan to spend more on its defense have come to nothing but to indicate growing impatience in the US toward this country.

A hawkish member of the US Senate submitted a resolution demanding revision of the Japan-US security treaty to pressure this nation into doing more for its defense. It was reported that a Japanese critic urged the senator to submit such a resolution. The critic denied this.

The senator was persuaded to withdraw the resolution and, therefore, no major problem will arise. But Japan must henceforth be watchful of such sentiments in Washington.

Last week, a resolution was submitted to Congress demanding that Japan pay 2 percent of its GNP to the US as a "security tax." We doubt the sanity of the congressman who proposed such a resolution.

Security Pact Is Stabilizer

First we would like to stress that the security treaty is the basis of the strong bond and friendship between Japan and the US. This treaty can neither be scrapped nor revised in view of the situation in Asia which would be seriously destabilized by such action.

We realize that behind such a proposal was the dissatisfaction in the US with what is interpreted as "Japan's free ride" on the treaty without its assuming a greater defense burden. However, the US is receiving benefits from the treaty which it must keep in mind. The security treaty helps ensure the security of the Far East and Pacific.

The proposal to impose a tax of two percent of our GNP hardly deserves comment. Why should Japan pay such a tax? Japan fulfills its duties under the security treaty and performs an equitable defense role. The congressman should be reminded that Japan

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is not US territory and therefore the US has no right to tax us.

Silly Proposals Backfire

Nevertheless, such preposterous proposals could act to stimulate US dissatisfaction. We are particularly concerned about any linkage between Japan's defense budget and Japan's trade surplus with the US, which is expected to reach \$15 billion this year. The government should take action to prevent the trade problem from worsening relations with the US.

Also, it is a questionable practice for a Japanese to try to use the US to accomplish domestic goals. In 1962, then Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) secretary-general Kakuei Tanaka proposed to then US attorney general Robert Kennedy that the US demand that Japan amend its constitution and rearm as the price for getting Okinawa back. This plot failed.

It is not the US which will decide whether our constitution is changed or the substance of our foreign policy. This is the sole right of the Japanese people.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

KIMURA PREDICTS MORE CONTACT AMONG U.S., PLO, SAUDI ARABIA

Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 16 Oct 81 p 1

[Text]

Former Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura, who stage-managed PLO leader Yasser Arafat's visit to Japan, believes that all types of contact among the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the PLO and other parties involved in the Middle East problem will grow in the months ahead.

"They are groping for a fresh course toward a comprehensive Middle East peace that would follow the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories under the Camp David accords," explained Kimura in an interview with The Japan Times Thursday.

"Even the U.S. is reluctantly accepting the view that no lasting peace could be realized in that region without mutual and simultaneous recognition by Israel and the Palestinians of their right to exist."

"Under these circumstances, Chairman Arafat's visit to Tokyo was fruitful to some extent because he impressed the Japanese with his realistic and flexible attitude toward the Middle East problem, while Japan obtained leverage to promote further dialogues among all the parties concerned," Kimura said.

Arafat left Tokyo for Vietnam Thursday morning.

Kimura, leader of the suprapartisan Japanese Dietmen's Association for Japan-Palestine Friendship, sponsored Arafat's visit here.

The PLO leader was treated as a de-facto official guest during his three-day stay here.

Arafat, Kimura continued, did not insist that he be treated as an official guest in Japan, since his priority was apparently to obtain a better understanding from Japan about the PLO's cause.

The PLO leader was "very grateful for the warm Japanese hospitality" and was convinced that his meetings with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and other top leaders served to heighten his organization's status in the international community, the senior Liberal Democrat said.

Kimura also said that the PLO succeeded "to some extent" in erasing its image as "an international terrorist organization" by demonstrating its moderate policies, including its flexible response to Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's eight-point peace proposal.

However, it was premature for Japan and other Western countries to expect the PLO to accept the package proposal completely at this time, when Israel is firmly holding its stand against the proposal, he said.

By accepting Arafat's visit here, Japan, which is already "several steps ahead" of European nations so far as Middle East policies are concerned, demonstrated its willingness to contribute to Middle East peace and stability, Kimura stressed.

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Japan need not and should not revise its present policy of maintaining a "fair and impartial attitude" toward both the Arab world and Israel. If it really wants to play "a bigger political role" in the Middle East problem, he suggested.

Yet the Dietman acknowledges that Japan's role in the region "is very limited." What the Japanese can do best is to continue appealing to all parties concerned to take a "fair and impartial" stance to help bring peace to the region as quickly as possible, he said.

"Fortunately, Prime Minister Suzuki is meeting with Prince Fahd, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and other world leaders at Cancun, Mexico, next week, and therefore he will have chances to make such an appeal," Kimura said.

"In the United States," he pointed out, "not only former presidents Ford and Carter but also Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski now suggest that the PLO will

have to be part of any peace negotiations."

Kimura, therefore, is inclined to think that Reagan may not continue rejecting their views forever, if he takes into account the political instability in Egypt caused by Sadat's assassination.

The Japanese legislator is convinced that even a little change in the U.S. government policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians will bear "a great favorable influence" on the minds of the Arab peoples and will pave the way for further progress in peace negotiations.

He takes an optimistic view that formal or informal contacts among all the parties, including the U.S. and the PLO will begin in the near future.

"In order to bring out big changes (in Middle East), a single effort is not enough, and concerted efforts by all parties are required," Kimura said in conclusion.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

RIVALRY BETWEEN MITI, FOREIGN MINISTRY GROWS

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 16 Oct 81 p 5

[Article by Yoshio Matsui]

[Text]

Nobuhiko Ushiba, former state minister in charge of external economic affairs and Japanese representative of the Japan-US Economic Group better known as the Wisemen's Group, said that the latest unique friction over scope of power of ministries in both the Japanese and US governments will hamper solution to the bilateral economic issues.

He expressed his views at a press meeting held after the Japanese side of the group last Tuesday presented to Prime Minister Suzuki the final report concerning the medium-range aspects of the Japan-US economic relations.

Friction of this kind has a long history. But the latest friction was witnessed in the trilateral ministerial conference among Japan, the US and West Europe.

The fact that the report refers to the conference means that friction over competency of the tripartite conference has intensified.

This international conference came into existence following a proposal by the EC.

The domestic dispute over the conference was touched off by an invitation to International Trade and Industry Minister Rokusuke Tanaka from US Special Trade Representative William E. Brock.

It was natural for Brock to sent the invitation to Tanaka as he is considered to be the main leader of Japanese economy, particularly trading, in the capacity of international trade and industry minister.

But this later provoked the Foreign Ministry on the ground that it was unprecedented that MITI be placed in the upper gallery with regard to an international conference.

Under such circumstances, the Foreign Ministry contacted the US Department of State about the conference. It was told that the conference was planned voluntarily by the trade representative without consulting the State Department.

Tanaka, however, had earlier sent a letter expressing his wish to attend the meeting.

To make matters worse, MITI harbors a sentiment of hostility against the Foreign Ministry.

Believing that there is nothing wrong if its top minister wants to attend an international conference, MITI says that the Foreign Ministry is interfering in its activities.

In this way the rivalry between the two ministries has taken the form of friction over degree of power.

After readjusting views at a high-level working meeting in Washington on Sep-

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tember 14 and 15, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiyooki Kikuchi told a press conference that the projected meeting was as obscure as something like shooting in the dark, suggesting that it might be canceled.

This naturally caused ire on the US special trade representative and MITI. After consulting with each other, they announced that a preparatory meeting for the trilateral conference would be held in Chicago on September 24.

Surprised by the news, the Foreign Ministry again sent Kikuchi to the US. But he learned that the preparatory meeting was no more than a discussion luncheon and that what was talked at the luncheon was a repetition of trifle matters like whether the conference should be held or not.

After all, no concrete conclusion was reached at the luncheon.

But, MITI independently told a press meeting that the trilateral conference would be held in the US in November.

Under these circumstances, one is puzzled at

what is right and what is wrong. But it is certain that the struggle over power of the two ministries is deeply connected with the present enigmatic situation.

In addition, judging from the fact that the once planned preliminary meeting failed to be held, there seems to be discrepancy among the White House, the State Department and the special trade representative.

Will the international conference be held after all? There is no immediate answer to this. One cannot help but be amazed.

The trade problem, indeed, needs incessant dialog. Therefore, the trilateral conference, if held, will prove fruitful to some extent. But it is silly to fight over degree of power without deciding on what will be discussed at the meeting. Money spent from the state coffer for dispatching officials for the conference won't be a small sum.

The Wisemen's Group expressly referred to the dispute over this matter apparently because it regarded the friction of this kind as harmful.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SUZUKI INSPECTS MSDF REVIEW

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 1

[Text]

YOKOHAMA — Forty-five warships of the Maritime Self-Defense Force sailed past Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki Tuesday in Sagami Bay, Kanagawa Prefecture, in the first naval review conducted in eight years.

Fifty-five aircraft, including P2J antisubmarine planes, also took part in the review in waters off Enoshima while some 3,000 unionists and pacifist group members demonstrated at Kugenuma beach in Fujisawa.

The naval review had been suspended since 1974 after the first energy crisis in order to conserve fuel.

Prime Minister Suzuki witnessed the review with Director General Joji Omura of the Defense Agency, Adm. Tsugio Yata, chairman of the joint staff council, and other SDF officers from the 5,250-ton helicopter-carrying destroyer (DDH) Shirane, one of the most up-to-date warships of the MSDF.

He became the third prime minister to attend a naval review after Nobusuke Kishi in 1957 and Eisaku Sato in 1968.

Among the some 5,500 guests who also viewed the review aboard seven ships were Diet

members of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party plus ambassadors and military attaches from various countries.

The ships taking part included the missile-carrying destroyer (DDG) Tachikaze and the destroyer Akizuki.

The prime minister later read a message over radio to some 8,000 men who participated in the review in which he stressed the need to improve Japan's defense capability in the face of a severe international situation as well as to secure the nation's security through the Japan-U.S. security setup.

In prewar days, grand naval reviews were conducted by the Imperial Navy a total of 19 times until 1940, a year before the outbreak of the Pacific War.

After the war, naval reviews were held almost annually from 1957 until 1973.

Officials estimated the fuel oil bill for Tuesday's review at some 40 million yen (about \$174,000). The total will come to about 120 million yen (about \$522,000) if oil used for pre-review drills conducted on Oct. 30 and on Sunday were added, they stated.

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MEDIA REPORTS ON LEFT-RIGHT STRIFE IN JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 15 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Michisada Hirose: "Can Asukata mend the crack?--Left-right strife in JSP"]

[Text]

About 10 days have passed since the Tokyo chapter of the Japan Socialist Party split in two. The other parties have been watching the efforts that Chairman Ichio Asukata and Secretary - General Shinnen Tagaya are making to settle the dispute. But there is no indication that they are succeeding. Will a similar division occur in other JSP chapters across the country?

There are roughly three groups within the No. 1 Opposition party. One is the Socialist Association, a left-wing group of Marxists. Since they accuse the Japan Communist Party of deviations from Marxism, it may be said that theoretically they stand to the left of the JCP. The second group is made up of social democrats. The third group, which includes Asukata, stands in the middle.

There have been times when the broad left-right spectrum helped boost the JSP's strength. At such times, both the left and right wings were generous to each other. The conflict in the Tokyo chapter was started by the right wingers.

The right wingers propose to put the JSP firmly on a social democratic course in terms of official party theory, policy line and executive lineup at the party convention that is to be held early next year. They feel that the JSP

remains in the doldrums because they were able to win only a halfway victory in the intraparty strife four years ago. (Asukata was installed as chairman at that time, and seceders formed the United Social Democratic Party.)

The basic strategy of the right wingers is as follows:

1. They propose to abolish the party's quasi-platform, "The road to socialism in Japan." In accordance with a decision to review the document, which was taken during the strife four years ago, work is being carried out by the party's Socialism Theory Center, which is directed by former Chairman Seiichi Katsumata.

They intend to sweep away the Marxist views and language in the quasi-platform at the party convention in February next year. I don't recommend you to read this document. It was adopted at the 24th JSP convention in 1964, and is a mixture of Marxist and social democratic dogmas. It is full of contradictions. For example, it says that the JSP "respects parliamentary democracy," and immediately afterwards, expresses distrust in parliaments. It is so incoherent as to be incomprehensible even to students of politics.

2. The rightists propose to establish a policy for the JSP to join hands with the Clean Government Party (Komeito).

The breakup of the Tokyo chapter partly stemmed from differences over whether the JSP should join forces with the Komeito and other centrist parties or with the JCP in the 1983 Tokyo gubernatorial election. The rightists are irritated because the leftists raise objections to the "go with Komeito" line, which was formally adopted as a party policy in February last year, whenever there is a chance for them to do so.

3. Asukata sits astride a balance between the leftist and rightist forces. He is on the left when it comes to the national security issue, is critical of the Komeito's new security policy, which views the Self-Defense Forces as constitutional, and has said he will freeze the "go with Komeito" line (although he withdrew the statement later). The rightists have been growing critical of Asukata's left-leaning stance, and have begun considering replacing him with someone of their own.

The growth of the right wing within the JSP seems to be apparently closely connected with moves in labor circles. Within the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), which is the JSP's biggest base of support, two major unions, the All Japan Telecommunication Workers Union (Zendentsu) and the Japan Postal Workers Union (Zentei), have clearly endorsed

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the pro-Komeito line. Upper House member Shogo Oki, who heads the right-wing headquarters of the Tokyo chapter, hails from Zententsu.

Oki has discounted party fees to recruit a large number of Zententsu unionists into the JSP in line with Asukata's call to boost the party membership to one million. Whereas the party rules set the membership fee at 0.7 percent of income, he has lowered it to a monthly amount of ¥1,000, including the cost of subscription to the party organ.

The discount has made members of the leftist Socialist Association worry that if

the recruitment of new party members in large numbers continues, it may increase the right wing's say in the selection of convention delegates and other matters at the expense of the left wingers.

The leftist attack on Oki, which developed into the breakup of the Tokyo chapter, was, in effect, in self defense. The leftists are counting on Asukata's leadership to curb the party's tilt to the right, but the chairman feels that if he goes into action to protect the leftists, it might only encourage the rightist offensive.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

KOMEITO NEW SECURITY CONCEPT ANALYZED

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 21 Oct 81 p 2

[Nagatacho Doings column by Takehiko Takahashi: "Komeito's New Security Concept"]

[Text]

The Komeito held an expanded central executive committee meeting in the afternoon of Oct. 14 and decided a new security policy. The point deserving attention here is that the Self-Defense Forces have been recognized as being constitutional.

Up to now the Komeito's attitude was one of doubt as to whether the SDF were not a violation of the Constitution. But now, in clarifying the Komeito's position regarding Article 9 of the Constitution, it has accepted the Self-Defense Forces as constitutional.

Article 9 prescribes "the renunciation of war." The first paragraph states that "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes" will be renounced forever. The second paragraph states that "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."

Persons who regard the SDF as being unconstitutional say that "the aim of the preceding paragraph" (in the second paragraph) is "to renounce the threat or use of force forever." On the other hand, those who believe that the SDF are constitutional interpret "the aim of

the preceding paragraph" as referring to: "as a means of settling international disputes."

New Interpretation

In the Komeito's new policy, the interpretation is that the use of the SDF not "as a means of settling international disputes" but as a means of defense "to maintain a peaceful existence" is permissible. This is the same as the reason why the government and the Liberal-Democratic Party have considered the SDF as being constitutional up to now. In this sense, the Komeito now stands in the same position as the LDP in the interpretation of Article 9.

The aim of the Komeito's defense policy is "preservation of the national land." For this purpose, it proposes: (1) improvement of warning and information collecting capabilities, (2) equipment to prevent attacks in territorial waters and to interdict a coastal landing, (3) equipment to intercept attacks from the air and to prevent a landing, and (4) equipment for defense of the national land. At the same time, no nuclear arms will be possessed.

The problem is the cost of preparing the capability to

safeguard the national land. In this respect, it is stated that "the expenses for defense will be kept within 1 percent of the GNP." Among the Komeito executives, there were some who expressed the view that this should read "within 1 percent of the GNP for the time being." However, the expression "for the time being" was deleted.

A Komeito executive explains this as follows:

"Unless it is stated that the cost should be within 1 percent of the GNP, opposition will arise within the party. In the same sense, the expression "for the time being" should not be used at present and it was therefore eliminated.

"It is dangerous to look at defense from the cost phase alone. It might lead to the view that nuclear arms would be comparatively the least expensive. Accordingly, if it becomes absolutely necessary for protection of the national land, exceeding 1 percent of the GNP cannot be helped at a certain stage."

The same official further declared:

"Because of this new defense policy, there is criticism that the Komeito has moved toward the right. This criticism is

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unwarranted. If strengthening military capability signifies a move toward the right, then all the socialist countries must be considered as advancing toward the right.

"Rather than being described as 'moving toward the right,' we would like to advance by carrying out a dovish security policy."

Another point drawing attention in the Komeito's new security policy is that the party is seeking to define the SDF's "scale of action." This has something in common with the "legislation for an emergency" which the government and the

LDP are studying. The Komeito is also proposing the establishment of an Overall Defense Council. It can be said that the Komeito's defense policy has entered a common ground with the LDP and Democratic Socialist Party.

This is equivalent to a liquidation of the Komeito's political course which had hitherto kept a "Japan Socialist Party-Komeito-DSP course" under consideration.

Because of the Komeito's new defense concept, the foundation has been lost for a JSP-Komeito concept of government administration.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

LENGTH OF LOCKHEED TRIAL CRITICIZED

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 27 Oct 81 p 2

["Zooming-In" column by Hideo Matsuoka]

[Text]

The Lockheed trial has continued without letup for five years now. If this were an ordinary trial of no particular significance, the nation by now would have forgotten about it or have lost interest in following the developments.

The verdict will be out after the significance of the case has been completely lost. The instance of forgetfulness applies to the Lockheed trial, too—the "natural erosion" of the case, as it is called in the press.

National attention is retained mostly through the media playing up developments in court whenever something happens. It may sound natural for the media to keep playing up how the "crimes of a prime minister" are tried.

But following one trial for five or six years as meticulously as they do requires no small effort on the part of the media. If this persistent coverage is mainly responsible for chaining public interest to the Lockheed affair for so long, it is proof that mental health has not completely left the media over here.

Whatever the reason, the trial has been taking too much time. For some involved in the

Lockheed scandal, the trial may be coming to an end in November or spring next year.

But no end is in sight for Kakuei Tanaka, who is undoubtedly the central figure in the trial.

A trial is not to be commended for the short time it takes. Still, five years and no prospects of an end in sight are far removed from the reality of our world. In our world, this state is called inefficiency. The nation is not happy about this gradual but steady and seemingly interminable spending of tax money.

The nation holds the court in respect. The court is somewhat sacrosanct in nature. People really consider it to be above them. There is comparatively little criticism of courts from the public.

But the court, on its part, should not take advantage of public tolerance. Is the trial being drawn out because the judges prefer to sit on the case instead of doing their best to exercise prudence? Isn't the soldiering of the judges the cause of the lengthy delay?

Judges, of course, do not have complete freedom in the con-

duct of court proceedings. Trials move along on the joint efforts of the bench, prosecution and defense.

Each utilizes various ploys. One of the ploys of the defense is stalling. The bench cannot one-sidedly order the defense to quit stalling so that it can speed up the proceedings.

But it was the country's judiciary that favored, at least once in the past, a trial without the benefit of legal counsel for the accused. The judiciary may well do something to counter the defense stonewalling, instead of just sitting tight and watching the delaying tactics.

The Lockheed case may be an important trial, but it should not be difficult. The two points of substance are whether the controversial 500 million yen actually lined Tanaka's pocket, and what constitutes the prime minister's official functions.

Concerning the 500 million yen, facts have been virtually established that it was delivered to Tanaka. The Marubeni executives, who have been charged with bribing Tanaka, have admitted the bribery in court.

They have even given

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detailed descriptions concerning the days, hours, places and other circumstances relating to the deliveries of cash. Their testimony is too accurate for a concoction of convenience. The defense will need an unusual amount of counterevidence to disprove the Marubeni officials.

Enomoto's Alibi

To prove the alibi of Enomoto, Tanaka's secretary who is alleged to have taken delivery of the bribes for Tanaka, the defense has produced many witnesses who said they had met Enomoto at the time and place where he was, according to the prosecution, and he had received the money.

The testimony of one witness after another is being quashed under needling cross-examinations by the prosecution. Most recently, Enomoto refused to comply with a prosecution request to question him.

Court tactics are varied, both for the prosecution and defense, as well as the bench. As there is what is called "announcement effect" in making announcements, there is "introduction effect" in introducing witnesses in court, depending on when and how they are introduced.

Refusal by the accused to testify is also one of the tactics. In the past, Enomoto chose to answer all questions from both the defense and the prosecution.

Now, as the allegations establishing his alibi have begun to collapse one after another under rebuttal by the prosecution, Enomoto suddenly has chosen to keep silent.

Nobody can blame the judges if they take Enomoto's refusal

to answer as proof that his alibi cannot stand up to the probing. The judges may reasonably be regarded as having formed their own views concerning Enomoto's alibi.

If the prospects, as of this moment, of the final outcome in the trial are likened to a balance situation, the pan weighed with the testimony of Marubeni officials is dropping under the weight of the substance of the testimony, while the other pan on which Enomoto rides is rising fast as testimony to his alibi are disputed one after another by the prosecution.

The balance beam is tipping some 70 to 80 degrees in favor of the Marubeni men's testimony. Now Kakuei Tanaka appears to be mobilizing his political clout to put every counterweight possible on Enomoto's pan. Such attempts, after all, will be to no avail. Tanaka is hereby advised to stop these futile efforts.

Some even think that the trial of Tanaka is taking so much time because the judges are somewhat reserved, apparently under the influence of the white-collar syndrome, in treating Tanaka in the same way they do other plaintiffs of no particular social status.

Therefore, it will not be very surprising if Tanaka maneuvers to take advantage of his social prominence to influence the trial.

His psychology is very understandable. But I hope the Japanese judiciary has not lowered itself to the gutter level.

Any news of Tanaka engaging in such maneuvering should only help antagonize a judge, if the judge is a person of normal intellect. This means that, by politically maneuvering,

Tanaka is only hurting himself in court.

In the court battle over Enomoto's alibi, I was impressed by the prosecution's lack of homework and spadework. The prosecution even seemed to be pulling its punches. It should not be difficult for it to hold suspected parties, including witnesses for Enomoto, in custody for thorough questioning.

Enomoto himself told everything to the prosecutors the day after his arrest. The prosecution then should have collected evidence backing up Enomoto's confessions.

Instead, it simply checked Enomoto's confessions, which were legally unsubstantiated, against the testimony of others. When Enomoto publicly repudiated in court what he had told investigators in the prosecutor's office, the whole structure of the plot along which the prosecution argued appeared sometimes to be on thin ice.

Therefore, when a suspect makes a confession in a pretrial investigation, the prosecutor should take steps to legally substantiate the confession so that the confessor cannot easily refute his own statements later in court.

In cases of political bribery, it is particularly difficult to gather evidence. The "Shimizu note" (a diary kept by Shimizu, the driver of Enomoto's official car when he was the prime minister's secretary) came as a surprise to the prosecution when it was presented in court as evidence to prove Enomoto's alibi.

Only Fortune

The surprise on the part of the prosecution shows it had not

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done enough homework. It was only fortunate for the prosecution that the "Shimizu note" was not good enough to clear Enomoto of the charge that he took the money for Tanaka. The prosecution should have learned a bitter lesson.

Professor Kenichi Fukui, of Kyoto University earned a Nobel Chemistry Prize. Mention of Prof. Fukui's name here must sound most inappropriate.

But the point I want to make is that the top clutch of the Japanese academic world is of such a high level that persons in the clutch earn Nobel prizes.

By comparison, the top clutch politicians in Japan are mostly anxious to earn bribes. Earning Nobel prizes and political bribes are both acts of the Japanese, although the two

acts are poles apart in nature.

This is why Japan is called a country of third-rate politics. It means our country is being run by third-rate politicians. We have legitimate reason to worry our heads off.

The accused in courts cannot be called criminals until and unless the court pronounces them as such. In the case of politicians being put on trial, they should take moral responsibility even before the verdicts are out.

Not a smattering of such sense of responsibility exists in Tanaka. Instead, he is ordering some 100 politicians in his faction around as he sees fit. How long is the nation going to tolerate this political anomaly? It's about time we gave it the shake.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

NEXT JSP CHAIRMAN LIKELY TO BE SELECTED BY VOTE

Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Nov 81 p 1

[Text]

The Japan Socialist Party's next chairman is likely to be chosen by vote for the first time in the party's history.

The No. 1 Opposition party set up a chairmanship election system in 1977, but there has so far been no contest.

A clash is now shaping up between Chairman Ichio Asukata and one or two right-wing candidates. Speaking in Takamatsu City, Kagawa Prefecture, Sunday, Asukata indicated that he is determined to seek re-election in December.

The right-wingers earlier started work to select a candidate to run against Asukata.

Masao Hori, former chairman of the JSP Policy Board, is generally favored as a possible candidate, but Vice Chairman Shoichi Shimodaira has indicated that he intends to run. Although some people contend that a unified candidate must be put up if the right-wingers are to defeat Asukata, no progress has been made to that end.

Talking to newsmen in Takamatsu, Asukata implied that he is prepared to take up a right-wing challenge. Referring to the chairmanship election system, he said he asked the late Chairman Tomomi Narita to create the system. He added that the selection of the party chief by vote is important from the viewpoint of intraparty democracy.

With regard to the question of seeking re-election to a third term in office, Asukata said it is still not the time to discuss the matter, but he indicated that he intends to continue pursuing the tasks for party reform he took over from Narita, such as the drive to boost the JSP membership to one million, a review of the party's de facto platform "The Road to Socialism in Japan," and the dissolution of factions.

His reference to those tasks was taken as indicating that he is confident he will win in a chairmanship election.

The JSP chief was in Takamatsu to attend the 18th national convention of the League to Defend the Constitution. Responding to a reporter's question after paying homage at the grave of Narita in the city, Asukata said he renewed his pledge to do his best to the late party leader. He thus indicated that he intends to stay on as chairman.

Asukata will be supported by the Socialist Association, a Marxist group, and other left-wingers in his re-election bid.

The chairmanship election system was created to meet a condition set by Asukata for accepting the top party post in 1977. He was then Mayor of Yokohama.

As it has not been tested, the system has many deficiencies. For example, there is no provision as to whether one has to get more than half of the votes to be a winner or needs only to get more votes than one's rival.

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DIET DEFLATES GOVERNMENT REFORM

Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text]

The Suzuki Cabinet has safely ridden out the critical first half of the current extraordinary Diet session, having disproved the earlier fear that it was heading for certain trouble. Once the ad hoc committee on government reform was set up in the Lower House, parliamentary activities went on exactly according to the scenario of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). The result is that the reform bill already has been passed by the Lower House and is now ready for Upper House action this month.

Two main reasons may be given to explain the smooth sailing. First, there is the fact that the reform bill itself is but a painless first step on the long road toward small government.

It would not be wrong to call it as nothing more than a make-shift attempt to save some ¥250 billion in government subsidies. For all the great publicity given the measure initially, the truth about the first administrative reform bill produced by the Suzuki government has been better appreciated now than some time ago.

Second, the government's success in managing with relative ease the first half of the current Diet was greatly assisted by a disarray among the opposition parties and, worse, their not being prepared to challenge frontally the worth of the government-introduced reform measure.

The Japan Socialist and Communist Parties have remained opposed to the present proposal from the start for ideological reasons whereas centrist parties like Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party are ready to support it if the government accepts their suggestions for improvement.

Given the numerical preponderance of the LDP, the divided state of the opposition camp can hardly improve the chances of effectively undercutting the value of the reform bill or of forcing on the government a change in the bill's contents.

The opposition parties have been also outmaneuvered by the government and the LDP which have made maximum use of the pay raise issue for public corporation workers to blunt their resistance to the reform bill. The conservatives are most likely to exploit a similar pay increase proposal for civil servants to their tactical advantage this time in the Upper House. The opposition parties' preoccupation with pay raises for public sector unions even had an effect of sidetracking the main debate on government reform.

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Long hours were spent on interpellations over the reform bill at the Lower House. Still, these fell short of making clear for the benefit of the people what government reorganization this country ultimately needs.

If the present measure is but a humble beginning, our legislators are obligated, toward the public, to make sure that this modest start will lead to a larger revamping of our government organization and practices.

In fact, government leaders are more responsible than anyone else for this failure to outline the ultimately necessary reforms. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and Yasuhiro Nakasone, director general of the Administrative Management Agency, both resorted to a tactic of evasion throughout the Lower House debate, saying that they were still waiting for the Doko commission to produce more recommendations.

Respecting the authority of the government reform commission and its members' opinion is entirely appropriate. But what the Suzuki government is doing really is to use the commission as a pretext for avoiding making hard policy decisions of its own.

This abandonment by government leaders of policy-making initiative has been best illustrated by their behavior over the question of a tax raise for fiscal 1983 or later. They chose to remain vague about it for a long time after the start of the current Diet. But recently they declared they had no thought of a new tax raise only after the Doko commission declared that the talk of a tax increase and the small government drive are incompatible as of now.

Actually the opposition parties have done little to win support to their view of the LDP-proposed reform bill that it would only serve the purpose of funding more for defense at the expense of social welfare. If they mean what they say, the parties of the left must show in the course of the Upper House debate that the proposed cut in subsidies will indeed hurt essential social programs.

The Japanese people support the cause of small government principally because they fear that the growth of government will necessarily entail higher taxes. They are worried at the same time how their security will be affected by the small government reforms especially in the field of public pensions. Both the government and legislators must respond to popular apprehensions of this kind that have received only insufficient attention so far in the current Diet.

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JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY SUPPORTER'S VIEWS EXPRESSED

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 2

[Editorial: "JSP and Enthusiasm"]

[Text]

Nearly one year has passed since Japan Socialist Party Chairman Ichio Asukata, during the JSP convention toward the end of last year, called for "burning action" by the largest opposition party. Has the JSP continued "burning?"

At least the general public does not think so. Party members, claimed to be about 50,000, may have continued steady activities but the party as a whole has failed to impress us. We point out that the Asukata leadership is inadequate.

The frank view of the JSP supporters is that the dispute between the leftist and rightist groups on the socialist policy line has continued too long. On Oct. 29, the party central executive committee members agreed to review the "road to socialism in Japan," aimed at putting an end to the dispute by 1983. We fear that the party will put an end to the dispute with an ambiguous compromise, judging from the past developments involving intra-party disputes.

We call for JSP members to engage in effective discussions and reach a clear-cut conclusion. A repetition of compromises for convenience's sake, based on the excuse of maintaining party unity, will result in a further deteriorated image of the party. Some 10 million voters for the party are not necessarily active supporters.

To respond to such a demand, the JSP must remodel itself into a strong party based on actual society. The inflexible socialist theory defined in the "road" is no longer practical. The decision to review the "road" is a natural outcome. We call for both the leftists, the supporters of the "road" theory, and the

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rightists to engage in a frank exchange of views to put an end to the dispute.

Coincidentally, various movements have surfaced in the Japan Socialist Party. For example, the JSP Tokyo branch has been split into two due to the difference of views on the "road" between the two rival groups. Another example is a recent demand from a rightist wing for the resignation of the Asukata leadership and its support for a rival candidate who will compete for the chairmanship with Asukata in the December election.

We believe that the JSP must bear a heavier responsibility in the current decade and would like to see the JSP really burning with enthusiasm.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

KASUGA EAGER TO ACHIEVE COALESCENCE OF CENTRIST FORCES

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 2

["Nagatacho Doings" column by Takehiko Takahashi]

[Text]

Ikko Kasuga, adviser to the Democratic Socialist Party, attended a "People's Conference to Protect Japan" on Oct. 26 and spoke in front of about 2,000 people. This conference has a strong conservative coloring but its local organizations have already been formed in 28 prefectures.

In his speech, Kasuga criticized the Liberal-Democratic Party, declaring that while the LDP has decided, as a party, on the revision of the Constitution, the LDP government is talking about safeguarding the Constitution.

In addition, although a cabinet decision has been reached to study legislation to cope with an emergency, this has not been done as yet. The LDP only pays lip-service and does nothing—this is Kasuga's criticism.

Speaking in typical Kasuga style at the time, he said, "as far as thinking is concerned, even a university coed can think—as far as talking is concerned, even comic dialogists can talk."

What this Kasuga is tenaciously seeking to achieve at the present time is a coalescence of centrist influences. He states that in order to put a period to the LDP's long continuing administration, it is necessary for the middle-of-the-

road influences to combine and carry out brisk activities.

Together with DSP Chairman Ryosaku Sasaki, who follows a similar line of thinking, Kasuga approached the Komeito. In the past the Komeito and the DSP have had the experience of cooperating in elections and even the concept for a centrist forces' administration had once been prepared.

The Komeito responded to the DSP's call and went so far as to show the attitude that if a coalescence of centrist forces could be achieved, the Komeito would be willing to dissolve the party. In reality, however, not the slightest progress has been seen.

Unified Faction

While the coalescence of the middle-of-the-road influences was puttering around, the New Liberal Club and United Socialist Democratic Party went ahead to form a unified faction within the Diet. Both the NLC and USDP's way of thinking differs considerably from that of the DSP. This is clearly recognized by Kasuga.

Kasuga says that "even if a coalescence of centrist forces is realized, there are some persons in the New Liberal Club who are likely to back out. Moreover, there are persons whom we cannot call as

comrades." It seems that Kasuga is referring to such persons as Tokuma Utsunomiya (member of the House of Councillors) who is enthusiastic about the peace movement.

Kasuga's aim for the time being is to form a unified faction of centrist forces within the Diet. Nevertheless, if such a unified faction is formed within the Diet, the chairmen of the parties' Diet policy committees will become one person—the representative of the faction—and the statements to be made in the plenary sessions and committee meetings will be centered on the faction's representative. The opportunities for the respective parties to make statements will decrease. This would be a "minus" factor for a political party.

Kasuga has therefore retreated one step. He is thinking now of forming a joint body and of carrying out Diet activities through the decisions made by the chairmen of the Diet policy committees of the four middle-of-the-road political parties. He would like to have this realized during the present extraordinary Diet session and to establish next a joint committee for election countermeasures.

If the four centrist parties

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cooperate and battle in an election together, there is the possibility that an influence surpassing that of the Japan Socialist Party can be formed. If that is achieved, the position of the No. 1 opposition can be obtained.

This is bound to have a big impact on the Japan Socialist Party. The Shakai Shugiha and anti-Shakai Shugiha are now in confrontation within the JSP. This is also an ideological confrontation on whether to adhere to Marxism or anti-Marxism. If the middle-of-the-road influences surpass the Japan Socialist Party, there is a possibility of the anti-Marxists separating from the Marxists and joining the middle-of-the-road influences. If this occurs, it might be possible for the middle-of-the-road influences,

centering on the Komeito and DSP, and obtaining the participation of the New Liberal Club, United Socialist Democratic Party, and a part of the JSP, to secure from 170 to 180 Diet seats.

This is Kasuga's strategy. The reality is not moving in accordance with this strategy of Kasuga. And yet Kasuga is confident, believing that the Komeito's adoption of a realistic course has given his strategy a boost.

Even the Komeito and DSP are not moving definitely toward a coalescence. It is therefore most difficult to prophesy when and if Kasuga's concept will be realized. But since Kasuga is a man of action, he is likely to continue along this strategy without letup.

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MILITARY

FORMER GENERALS DEPLORE 'SELF DEFENSE FORCES'

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Jul 81 pp 98-106

[Discussion involving the following participants: Hiroomi Kurisu, former chairman of the Joint Staff Council and a general in the Ground Self Defense Force; Kazuomi Uchida, former chief of Staff, Maritime Self Defense Force; Goro Takeda, former chairman of the Joint Staff Council and a general in the Air Self Defense Force]

[Text] United States and Soviet Union Preparing for Sometime in the 1980's

[Question: There is a theory in the streets that a crisis will occur in the 1980's. People are saying that there will be a large-scale military event with the characteristics of World War III. At the Hawaii conference, the United States made very specific and strict demands for the Japanese defense effort. I have heard that this was based on a scenario of trouble beginning in the Middle East and resulting in an invasion of Hokkaido by the Soviet Army. What about that?

Takeda: I think it is doubtful that a fire starting up in the Middle East would immediately spread to Hokkaido. Before that, it could go to Europe or the Korean Peninsula could stand in its way. In fact, it might start in Korea. Yugoslavia is also dangerous.

Uchida: Everything is linked up.

Question: If a Middle East war occurs red, the Seventh Fleet would move into the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union would attempt to move into the gap, and Japan would try to close the three straits around the Japanese islands to stop them. This would result in a local war. That's the scenario, right?

Uchida: There is the question of why it would break out in the Middle East. Also, we must consider the preliminary conditions that would cause the Soviet Union to go that far. It would do that if it reached the point of being put in an impossible position when it tried to maintain the status quo. This would happen if it decided it was necessary to find a way to escape from the dwindling state of its fortunes or if it could not maintain the communist system any longer. At such a time, it might make a move in the Middle East, if that were the easy thing to do. It could move into Japan and cause a disturbance, and then make a frontal assault on NATO. Or it could attack NATO first and then come to Japan or cause trouble on the Chinese border. It is first and then come to Japan or cause trouble on the Chinese border. It is conceivable that it would follow a pattern of making a move where it is easiest.

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What America fears most is that the Soviet Union is in a position to move in any direction. And in reality, the state of Russian military expansion is awesome. For example, in submarines, it plans to build 40 vessels a year. America is only building 12. That is three times as much. In addition, these submarines will carry cruise missiles and they can dive to 1,300 meters. There are a large number of these and they are very well equipped. In addition, it is building aircraft carriers and cruisers. It is carrying out a military expansion beyond our imagination. When we see this happening right before our eyes, we cannot say that America is lying to us or threatening us. We have to believe that it is serious.

Takeda: During the first part of the Carter administration, America thought that if it slowed down the military expansion, Russia would respond because it was having economic difficulties. However, even though Russia declined economically, its military expansion continued. Then, with the invasion of Afghanistan, even the Carter administration realized that it had made a mistake.

Uchida: America is attempting to complete preparations to counter the Soviets by the tentative target of 1985. So the pace of preparation in Japan will not match that of the United States.

Question: We can cope with the period after 1985, but are we in danger before then? In the short term, is there a chance for the Soviet Union?

Uchida: Yes, if the Soviet Union makes the decision now to resort to military power. I do not think it has gone that far yet.

However, if a conflict were to occur in the Middle East, and oil stopped coming to Western Europe and Japan, there would be a big shift in the balance of power. Western Europe and Japan, there would be a big shift in the balance of power. Western Europe depends on the Middle East for approximately 600 million tons of oil. Japan is buying about 200 million tons. If a conflagration were to occur there, it would be very threatening. Therefore, we are doing our best to prevent that from happening. The Soviet Union also desires to maintain the status quo. Things are all right now because of fear and a military balance. Just the same, if religious or political troubles were to blow up in the Middle East and spread over the entire area, the Soviet Union would immediately have an advantage. The free countries would not be able to use Middle Eastern oil. If that happened the military balance would be upset.

Japan Is About the Right Size for the Soviet Union

Takeda: Even if the Soviet Union does not intend to start a world war, if something started in the Middle East, it could be drawn into it, and things could escalate. Then, to restore its situation, it is possible that it might set its sights on a weak place to make an advance.

Kurisu: In the 18th century, Russia annexed more than 1 million square kilometers. In the 19th century, it absorbed 500,000 square kilometers in Southeast Asia alone and close to 1 million square kilometers in other areas. In the 20th century, it did not gain much territory until the last war, but with the war, it gained 680,000 square kilometers, including the three Baltic countries. It is not yet up to 1 million. Japan has about 370,000 square kilometers so it is just about the right size. (laugh) That is a joke. (laugh)

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Uchida: Intimidation is possible as a tactic.

Takeda: It would never threaten Japan alone without thinking about a world war. If the Soviets made a move, the United States would counter it. This is the fate of a country like Japan, situated between the great powers. If Japan gave in to Soviet intimidation, the United States would try the same thing.

Kurisu: Nixon says that World War III has already begun but that the great war is not characterized by an exchange of nuclear attacks. It is a psychological war carried out by threat and intimidation. A psychological war aims at getting the opponent to give up.

However, someone spoke of America getting its military forces ready by 1985. I believe this has been postponed. The modernization plans for each of the three services will take until 1987-88 for completion. Such items as the Trident submarine, a 600-vessel fleet, and the B-1 (supersonic heavy bomber) will all take until 1988 to be completed.

Takeda: All of them were put aside during the Carter administration.

Kurisu: And the same thing is reported of the Soviet Union. Even the Siberian railroad will not be completed by 1985. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have had to extend their tentative deadline beyond 1985. In brief, it seems that they are postponing the deadline for their buildup to the late eighties or the early nineties. This is not a target date for conflict. It is a deadline for reaching a position where these countries can be at peace with themselves while being conscious of the opponent. I do not think that America's military power has declined at all. The gap has only closed up more.

War Moves With the Momentum of the Times

Takeda: If things keep going at this rate, the United States will be completely surpassed by the Soviet Union. Therefore, they are working to open up the gap. They probably even want to speed up Reagan's 5-year plan.

Kurisu: That is why I think that both the United States and the Soviet Union will tend to suppress any sparks of trouble. While their forces are unprepared, they will just be bluffing each other. They are not really serious. So I think that if something happened in Europe or the Middle East, it would probably move to control it.

Takeda: Until it is ready, that is probably right. But war is not something that goes that smoothly. If trouble were to start in Poland next month, there is no telling how far it would spread. It would flow with the momentum of the times. That is why we must make the minimum necessary preparations.

Question: I would like to know roughly what stages the Japanese defense guidelines have passed through since the creation of the Self Defense Forces and what phase they are in now.

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Takeda: In 1957, the Basic National Defense Plan appeared. It called for gradual progress in preparing for national defense on the basis of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and within necessary limits, depending on the national situation. Based on this, we have increased our strength in 20 years from the first basic defense plan through the fourth basic defense plan.

However, the fourth basic defense plan took effect around 1972-73, the main years of detente. The people began to wonder why defense spending continued to increase in an era of peace. Questions on this were heard from the opposition parties in the Diet. Therefore, in 1976, the 1976 defense plan guidelines were prepared with the idea that a new defense policy was necessary.

This rested on the view that world peace would continue for some time, based on five conditions: First, there would not be a large war, a nuclear war, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, the antagonism between the Soviet Union and China would continue. Third, the U.S.-Japan mutual security arrangement would be firmly maintained. Fourth, there might be small disturbances, but no large ones, on the Korean Peninsula. And finally, the friendly relationship between the United States and China would continue. The Middle East situation was not even considered.

In other words, the conclusion was not reached by a military analysis. It was reached by saying that our present defense capability is this much, so next let's add a certain amount. The set idea of keeping it within 1 percent of the GNP derives from this.

Uchida: A goal for preparedness was never set.

Takeda: There is no mention of when certain things must be done. There is only the vague idea of "a defense capability which can repel a limited, small-scale invasion unaided." However, the government made this decision, and we might have been all right if a certain amount of effort had been given to defense and maintaining the rate of growth. But because of the rise in prices and other reasons, the content of our preparedness plan has continually been reduced. In the Air Self Defense Force, the 430 aircraft we should have had was reduced to 340.

Even then, the government at the time declared that this was the minimum necessary defense capability. In spite of that, it seems that this will not even be achieved by 1987, so the whole thing is ridiculous.

Fooling the People

Kurisu: I have a slightly different view from Mr Takeda. Up through the fourth basic plan we at least evaluated the situation and presented the goals we desired for 5 years. However, the subsequent defense guidelines do not include any situational judgment with reference to basic defense capability. In other words, an order was given for a time to stop in the situation of 1975. The idea for military preparedness was to continue what was done under the third and fourth basic defense policies, in other words, to maintain the status quo. I believe it is misleading the people to bring this out now as if it were a real goal.

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Unless the government changes this approach immediately, the basic defense of Japan cannot be secured. This is equivalent to not thinking about defense at all. I am severely critical on this point.

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Takeda: The cabinet when the fourth defense policy was adopted was the Miki cabinet, wasn't it?

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Uchida: At any rate, it seems strange that the things promised in 1976 will be fulfilled 10 years later. When they say they don't know if they can do it by 1987, they are double-crossing the people twice over.

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Kurisu: The true feeling of the civilians is that this is nothing but a policy for coping with the Diet and the media. They put everything in a medicinal wafer with sugar on it.

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Takeda: That plan started up on time even though all the chiefs of staff opposed it.

Kurisu: Yes, it did, didn't it?

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Takeda: I said earlier that there is no military logic in the standards of the defense guidelines. Even in the case of a limited small-scale invasion, not enough consideration has been given to what size force would come and what form it would take. Even if we are to fight together with the Americans when the Self Defense Forces cannot repel the invasion alone, there is no understanding of how this will be done. Everyone has hidden under the big shadow of America.

'Thinking Committee' Leaving Out the Military

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Uchida: We have prepared many proposals. However, they are research material and have not been publicized.

Takeda: What we need to ask ourselves is whether agreement has been attained between the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self Defense Forces. The answer is no. We are divided.

Uchida: Just the same, as long as we are restricted to 1 percent of the GNP, no plan can amount to much.

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Takeda: The idea of 1 percent of the GNP was developed at the same time as the defense guidelines.

Kurisu: Then the "Committee to Think About Defense" was formed and we presented a report to them.

Takeda: The Committee to Think About Defense was formed under the sponsorship of the director of the Defense Agency at the time, Sakata. I believe it was made up of five or six intellectuals such as the late political analyst, Kazushige Hirose, and the writer, Fusako Tsunoda.

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Uchida: There was also one before that during the term of Mr Nakasone.

Takeda: There was a briefing on keeping within 1 percent of the GNP during the Nakasone period, too, so I suppose the "thinking committee" took the approach of supporting the Defense Agency's proposal. Actually, someone with experience as chairman of the Joint Staff Council should have been a part of the committee. With some military advice, a new awareness of the problems should have emerged.

Kurisu: To state the case in stronger terms, former chairmen and members of the Joint Staff Council should have been doing the "thinking."

Uchida: The military presented a number of proposals for the second and third basic defense plans. The government listened to them but in the end did not have ears to hear. The initial plans were completely revised and we had to put up with plans reduced to the lowest possible level with none of what you referred to as military logic. These things should have been decided on the basis of an active debate between the government and the military. However, under civilian control, we are slapped down and all debate is stopped.

Therefore, the people on the frontline are placed in a difficult position. The Maritime Self Defense Force may be a special case, but since there is no standard for what is absolutely necessary, it is possible to make an estimate by judging that in relative terms a certain task can be performed with a certain force. For example, Prime Minister Suzuki spoke about patrolling the waters within a few hundred miles of Japan. If the number of ships is small, the number of patrols is simply reduced.

Takeda: At the end of each year, an estimate is made of what can be done with the strength available and a report is made. We ultimately come to the conclusion that nothing can be done without revising the defense guidelines. However, the government has resolved not to revise the defense guidelines, so we are left frustrated. It always ends in talk.

Kurisu: Two adjectives, "limited" and "small-scale," are used. Originally, it was one or the other. But the two terms were used to create the meaning of "a size which we can handle one way or another." (laugh) All the chiefs of staff were against this.

Takeda: Recently, discussion has finally emerged in the Diet about the number of divisions and the appropriate number of aircraft to go with them. Before it was all very vague.

Question: While they use the word "limited," the hypothetical enemy is the Soviet Union, isn't it?

Kurisu: That's right.

Takeda: There is no limited scenario for it.

The Important Issue Is Determination

Uchida: There are also obstacles in the system.

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Takeda: Under the present system, we cannot honestly do anything, can we? Even with the surprise attack defense proposed by Mr Kurisu, under the present system, we would be knocked out by the first attack, in 10 minutes, wouldn't we?

Kurisu: It is not only a problem of the system, it is a problem of the government's determination. There are many things that are not particularly limited by law but are simply not clearly specified.

Takeda: With respect to the emergency law system, if the Ground Self Defense Force wanted to take up a position when the enemy landed, it could not construct an ideal position under the present system. Also, aircraft would have to receive detailed instructions from the Aviation Bureau before they could take off. This is ridiculous. There are also restrictions on munitions under which so many meters of open land must surround so many tons of explosives. These kinds of things must be changed. They are a joke.

Kurisu: Going back to the basic defense capability concept, there is something called "warning time," the time for the government to evaluate the crisis. This is the problem of how long before a crisis occurs we should make preparations. The government says 1 year. There is no other country like this in the whole wide world. Usually, this time is given in terms of weeks or hours. The production of shells takes 13 months from the time the workers are collected and the materials have been imported, so they think that 1 year would be enough. This is foolish.

Uchida: In Europe, they think in terms of hours.

Takeda: The U.S. military are carrying out a plan for overseas procurement of equipment. They have placed enough for four divisions entirely in Europe. They are planning to increase this to enough for six divisions by 1987. With this, transport will be easy in an emergency. There is nothing like this in Japan. Even if the United States came to our aid, all the equipment would have to be shipped. Japan does not have the capability for this.

Kurisu: Everything is theoretically prepared according to the defense guidelines. It says that preparations are made sufficient for expansion in case of emergency.

Takeda: Everything is just fine in writing.

Uchida: Essentially, it is set up so that we cannot tell that there is a crisis until the shooting starts.

Kurisu: It is not even clear who the commander in chief of the Self Defense Forces is.

Question: Isn't it the chairman of the Joint Staff Council?

Kurisu: No, it's probably the prime minister or the director of the Defense Agency, but it is not clearly determined.

Takeda: It is probably the prime minister.

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Kurisu: That is who starts a war, but it is not all clear after that.

Takeda: Are you talking about the leader directly in charge?

Kurisu: Yes. There is probably no other country like this. In most other countries, the secretary of state takes charge or, ultimately, the president. This changes once a war begins. But the system is not at all clear in Japan.

Takeda: It seems that the chairman of the Joint Staff Council will not be needed once a war starts. (laugh) Ordinarily, there are laws which designate a joint staff council and a chairman and provide what their duties shall be. We do not have such laws. We look here and there and pick up things from various places until we finally figure out what our duties are.

Kurisu: Originally the post of Joint Staff Council chairman was created at the request of the United States. It was ordered to be established as a point of contact for U.S. troops stationed in Japan. The position was created without thinking about its content. It was revised once, but the revision did not amount to much.

I interpreted the situation in the opposite way. Since there are no regulations for the chairman's duties, I decided that I could do anything at all as long as I had the trust of the Defense Agency director general. I could have a say in military administration, military command, or personnel. I actually told people above me what to do on many occasions.

Uchida: Even the prime minister cannot make decisions on his own. He must present everything to the cabinet. It is a strange situation if the cabinet is to determine military strategy and provide military leadership.

The Military's Opinion Should Be Listened To

Takeda: We have been carrying out this defense study since Mr Kurisu's era. We could say that the military has done everything possible. If a conflagration were to break out in the Middle East and lead to a world war, who (the government, the Defense Agency, the troops, etc) could do what and when? And what should be done? When we try to pin this down, we find a lack of clear directives. In order to make the necessary laws and regulations, we must work together with the government. There are many things that must be done. With all our efforts up until now, we have finally managed to present an interim report in this Diet session.

However, things will not go well without the cooperation of the various ministries and agencies. In particular, this includes the laws I mentioned for controlling explosives and for traffic, public order, and aviation. Also, what can be done about civil defense, which is not under the jurisdiction of any ministry or agency? Since we are limited to defense, I believe we need to have some office in charge of air raid warnings and evacuation of civilians.

Kurisu: The newspapers often report important meetings of the various ministries, with cabinet ministers taking a leading role. This does not happen for the Defense Agency. It did in the past, but the practice has gradually disappeared. The meetings attended by the ministers are final budget report meetings and beer drinking parties to celebrate the completion of something. (laugh)

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Takeda: Once or twice a year.

Kurisu: A long time ago, important meetings were called by ministers. Even when I was lower in rank, I had the opportunity of attending several of those meetings.

Takeda: Now, the only time it happens is at budget time and when a foreign minister from another country is coming to Japan and we have to decide on our approach ahead of time.

Kurisu: It is just a ceremony.

Uchida: Everything is taken care of in the councillors' meetings. I think the director of the Defense Agency and the prime minister should listen more seriously to the opinions of the military.

Takeda: Because it is peacetime, there are no difficulties in everyday administration. But if a military emergency arises, there will be a problem. Therefore, even the defense study said that the chairman of the Joint Staff Council should be given more authority. The emergency law system has many areas where the people's individual rights are limited, so the Diet will have to debate the extent of these limitations. However, an actual proposal must be made to see what the reaction is.

Government Consideration Desired

Kurisu: I once made a report to one Defense Agency director general on the overall views of the Joint Staff Council concerning issues which we thought were very important to national policy. He said: "I understand. I actually agree. Otherwise, Japan cannot survive in the future." However, he said that it would be impossible to say this in public and he told me to burn the papers till there was nothing left and he would forget he had seen them. That is how it went. (laugh)

Takeda: This is changing the subject a little, but in case of an invasion, it is the Self Defense Forces which have to fight, right? And if we cannot win, it is meaningless. I think that this major goal is being forgotten. Some civilians think there is no reason to have jet fighter aircraft with speeds greater the speed of sound outside of training areas. This is a big mistake. In order to protect Japan, we must have fighters faster than the speed of sound and we must have heavily armed aircraft as well.

Then what should be done? It is not necessary to have the training areas secured by government authority? If the action taken by the government remains the same so that there is no meaning in having these areas, we cannot achieve the objective. We see the same inadequate concepts in both the defense guidelines and the overall system.

Uchida: Recently, there was a report of a Self Defense Force vessel breaking a fishing line. I would like to see the government take action so that such problems, just like the training area problems, would not occur.

Kurisu: Also, we cannot fire our largest artillery.

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Uchida: Ever since the crash of the Self Defense Force plane at Shizukuishi, public opinion has become more critical. It is difficult right now to conduct troop movements because of complaints about noise pollution.

Question: Let's go back to the theory of a crisis in the 1980's which we discussed at first. There is a theory that as long as Japan maintains unarmed neutrality, it can avoid a war, right?

Takeda: This is ridiculous. A valuable country like Japan will be taken over if it stays unarmed and neutral.

Uchida: There will probably not be a war where only Japan is taken over. I believe it will be a matter of how to dispose of Japan in the context of a world-wide strategy. No one will devise a limited strategy whereby Japan alone is attacked without using nuclear weapons. If it becomes necessary to take Japan on the basis of an overall strategy, we will probably be invaded.

Tragedy of Unarmed Neutrality

Kurisu: It will be a matter of getting rid of a nuisance. (laugh)

Takeda: It is a big mistake to suppose that if the Soviet Union were to take over while we are unarmed and neutral, a war could be avoided. Even America is not that nice. It would not just hand over Japan's economic and industrial power to the Soviets. If a war began, Japan's geopolitical value would become more important than those things.

Kurisu: Even if America did not destroy us, the war would not last forever. Eventually, peace would come. Then, although we would not have a different constitution, we would have to maintain an honorable position in world society. If we had been taken without a fight, we would be made fools of by the Soviet Union. America and other countries would not recognize the existence of the Japanese.

In the previous war, Denmark was almost put in that position. It was a first in world history for a country to surrender within 4 hours. When the German warships entered its northeastern territorial waters, not a shot was fired, even though it had shore defense batteries. The authorities gave orders not to resist. I suppose they thought that was best. Germany invaded Norway on the same day, but Norway resisted for 2 months, so it received both material and moral support from the Allies. Denmark was abandoned. Then Denmark realized that when peace came, it would be erased from the world map, so it began guerrilla resistance and set up a government in exile.

Uchida: Japan would disappear as a country. The young people are total cowards, so they would have to live as a subject people, without the self-respect to rebuild their own country.

Takeda: If Japan entered the Soviet bloc, it would not be able to trade freely. It is questionable whether 100 million people would be able to live in this small land.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

DEVELOPMENT STATUS OF ROBOT INDUSTRY OUTLINED

Tokyo SHUKAN ORU TOSHI in Japanese No 451, 16 Jul 81 pp 12-13

[Text] Japan Is the World Leader in Robot Strength

The Japanese robot industry had its start with the introduction of technology from the United States about 1965. This industry has since grown to the stage that at present it is a representative mechatronics industry which places Japan as the world's "robot ruler."

The production volume for 1980 was 78.4 billion yen and 19,700 units were produced, and the Japan Industrial Use Robot Industry Association estimates that this production will amount to 290 billion yen in 1985 and to 600 billion yen in 1990, and the possibility of breaking the 1-trillion-yen mark seems not too far away.

In the Western countries, as of March 1979, the number of robots on hand amounted to 5,850 units in West Germany and 3,255 units in the United States--an order of magnitude lower than the 47,000 units in use in Japan. A number of reasons can be cited for this tardy situation on the part of the Western countries.

Strengthen "Mishmash" of Technology

First of all, there is the difference in the makeup of the labor unions. Japan's labor unions are intra-industry unions, and while the introduction of robots causes changes in work assignments, it does not result in loss of jobs. In contrast, the unions of the Western world are classified according to different occupations, and the introduction of robots to welding and painting processes results directly in loss of jobs for welders and painters. This is why there has been extremely great opposition to the introduction of robots on the part of the workers. There was a strike lasting 3 weeks at the Rosetown plant of the American GM Company in February 1972. This is the famous incident known as "the Rosetown revolt," and the reason it occurred was the taking over of welding operations by the "Unimate robot," causing worker dissatisfaction. This clearly illustrates the differences in the manner of handling labor problems between Japan and the United States.

In the second place, there is the difference in the robot development system itself. As indicated by the statement that a robot is a model mechatronics product, it is a wedding of high-precision mechanical finishing technology and electron technology centered on the micron. The microns, sensors, and actuators which are the important constituent elements all involve technology that is not much different in America

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from that found in Japan, and there are some aspects where the Americans are decidedly superior. The difference lies in the fact that the industrial area which encompasses the "mishmash" of technology called mechatronics is greatly exploited in Japan. What cannot be overlooked here is the presence of integrated electrical makers such as Hitachi.

For example, Hitachi is comprised of 27 plants with seven research laboratories where research and development on heavy electrical equipment, light electrical equipment, semiconductors, nuclear power plants, and small production technology are under way. This means that all the technology directly tied in with robots is held by this one company, and this is an extremely convenient setup.

In this respect, representative American companies such as Unimation and Cincinnati Miracron are industries which belong to the machine industry family, and their strength in electronics is limited.

As robots of higher performance (intelligent robots) are developed, it is the quality of the software that is the soul of the control technology, more than the hardware making up the robot which becomes subject to question. When that comes to pass, even where a Japanese integrated maker is concerned, it will fall one step behind if its control technology is weak. On the other hand, it is rumored that the American giants of the computer industry, IBM and Texas Instruments, will enter this market, and they may become a major threat in control technology just because of their "capabilities."

Nevertheless, Japan has the stage to itself at the present time. In fact, the United States, which has fallen behind in turning to the use of robots to man its welding and painting lines, will be pushing its "rearmament" program for its production lines, and the American companies headed by GM should turn out to be a good market for robots in the future. Looking at last year's figures, there was as yet very little export of robots, but the Robot Industry Association is pointing toward an export rate of 20 percent in 1985 and 25 percent in 1990.

When that comes to pass, there probably will not be the frictional problems such as those that occurred following the torrential exports of automobiles and TV sets. This is because while robots require onsite service and parts supply, they are mainly a production commodity and are directly tied to "industrial secrets" such as alteration in production lines by the introducing industry and production technology. This alone presumes a relationship of trust between companies. Hitachi has bared its plans to enter into OEM supply agreements with American automatic companies and "gradually enter into onsite business."

Problems in Development of Intelligent Robots

The problem Japan, the "robot ruler," must face is the development of the intelligent robot which is the next generation robot. The reason for the urgency in speeding up development of this intelligent robot is the need to convert at least 25-30 percent of the assembly processes to robots in order to rationalize production lines, introduce conservation of labor, and enable realization of completely unmanned operations. All assembly processes are not as uniform in their nature of work as in welding, and the number of parts and work points will be much greater.

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
For this purpose, the makeup of the robot need only imitate the upper limb section of man (arms, wrists), but as the number of operations become greater and assemblies become more involved, any number of arms and hundreds of wrists will need to be involved in the application. In addition, the production line of the future will handle mostly a varied array of products, and pattern recognition will head the list of sensor technology, including recognition of sounds, voices and temperature.

At the present time, robots with assembly capability seems to be in the development stage throughout the world. Some representative models include the "Puma" of the American Unimation Company, of which the GM Corporation as the largest American robot introducing industry hopes to "introduce 5,000 units" over the next 10 years. This is a rather expansive hope, because at present there are at best 70 units in the whole world. Even in Japan, the present situation is that one or two units made by Kawasaki Heavy Industries are in the testing stage at some automobile makers.

Another problem remaining is how much line speed lost through introduction of sight and touch capabilities of the robot in order for it to judge and sense objects can be restored. On the other hand, advances in robot technology are taking place every day, and it is the general belief that the age of robots with actual assembly capabilities will be coming in 2-3 years.

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This Is the Intelligent Robot for Welding Application



Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Power source | 6. Main body |
| 2. Wrist | 7. Control section |
| 3. Hand or hand and fingers | 8. An intelligent robot is... |
| 4. Ultrasonic sensor | 9. Greatly different from present robots in that it operates through "intelligence" provided by sensor capabilities (upper right diagram) and awareness capabilities. |
| 5. Welding torch | |
| 10. The white arrows point to direction of movement | |

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

INDEPENDENT ACADEMY OF TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED

Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] Academy of Technology to be Established Independent of Science Council; Selection Committee Assigned by Prime Minister; LDP Prepares Bill; Government Approves Budget

The conflict between Director General Nakayama of the Prime Minister's Office and the Science Council of Japan (Yasuji Fushimi, chairman; 210 members) has become a serious problem. In the midst of this, the LDP Science and Technology Liaison Committee (Takashi Hashiguchi, chairman) completed drawing up a proposal for a "Japan Academy of Technology as the central organ for Japanese research in science and technology by making Department No 5 (technology department) of the Science Council independent. The plan is to submit this as House member legislation to the next ordinary session of the Diet. The government has given its consent to the bill and its funding. The aim of the academy is to promote a more active exchange between government, academia, and industry for "original and innovative development of science and technology." The selection committee in charge of recommending the chairman and members of the academy has been assigned by the prime minister, and financing is to be provided in equal parts by the government and by industry. Therefore, the Science Council is already criticizing this effort as "weakening the Science Council and threatening the independence of science." This also relates to government educational policy and the textbook problem, so it seems likely to cause debate.

"Weakening of Science Council", "Interference in Science": Science Council Protests

The LDP Science and Technology Liaison Committee was formed in response to the Science and Technology Cabinet Minister's Liaison Council organized last year. Until recently it was divided into seven sections; it has served as a forum for exchange of opinions about the proper role of science and technology with a view to the 21st century. It came to the conclusion that "greater development of science and technology is necessary to maintain and improve present economic growth in the future; Japan cannot survive unless the country is built up on the basis of science and technology." As a specific proposal, the committee formed the plan for the Japan Academy of Technology.

It used the academies of technology already set up in America and Sweden as models and also referred to the ideas of Dr Reona Ezaki, the Nobel Prize winner, for a technology academy. The committee held two meetings of subcommittee chairmen at the end of last month and listened to an explanation from Dr Ezaki, now back in Japan, about the operation and performance of the American Academy. Finally, an outline for the bill was decided upon as a subcommittee proposal.

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According to the proposal, the purpose of the academy would be "to promote exchange and mutual enlightenment of superior researchers and technicians involved in technology and closely related scientific studies in academic, industrial, and government institutions, and to contribute to the progress of original, innovative technology through research, analysis and evaluation of the possibilities of pioneering work in original new technology." The bill calls for far-ranging cooperation between government, academia, and industry in order to promote original research, said to be a weak area of Japanese science and technology, and "establish a system for proper evaluation" of research results (according to an LDP source).

Academy members will be recommended by a selection committee (appointed by the prime minister from people recommended by the committee chairman). They must: 1) be engaged in technological research or work duties and 2) have published excellent research papers related to technology or achieved superior results in technological work. The members will be appointed but must retire at the age of 60. (Council members must be over 55 years of age.) Total funding will be 1.5 billion yen, half to be provided by the government and half by private industry.

The bill provides that "the academy shall maintain close communications with the Science Council of Japan," presenting a scheme of coexistence with the Science Council. However, an LDP source who participated in the preparation of the bill emphasizes the necessity of establishing the academy as follows: "The members of the present Science Council are elderly and not very active. They present reports to the government only a few times a year. From the viewpoint of promoting scientific and technical development, they do not function effectively." He recognizes that certain features of the academy reflect dissatisfaction with the state of the Science Council. These include: 1) the method of selection (by recommendation; the Science Council members are elected), 2) a retirement age of 60 (there is no age limit for the Science Council), and 3) stricter qualifications.

In preparing this bill proposal, the LDP committee consulted unofficially with the government and obtained a basic agreement on the establishment of the academy.

The Science Council is strongly cautioning that "the government and the ruling party are attempting to weaken the Science Council," earnestly renewing their attack in the debate over the Science Council.

Reason for Existence of Department No 5--View of Yoshinosuke Yasojima, Head of Department No 5 in the Science Council of Japan

"I have not seen the LDP proposal so I cannot say much at this stage. However, Department No 5 is well aware of the importance of promoting science and technology in Japan. Even if a new organization is set up, Department No 5 itself still has a reason for existence. The field of technology is important, but is it not necessary to think about the position of technology in relation to all academic fields?"

Serious Debate; Government Working Behind the Scenes

The "Japan Academy of Technology Bill," drawn up by the LDP on 1 September, has a very strong political side.

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An LDP source says: "In drawing up the bill, we consulted with director generals Komoto of the Economic Planning Agency, Nakagawa of the Science and Technology Agency, and Nakayama of the Prime Minister's Office and obtained their approval for the substance of the bill." He admits that although this is referred to as an LDP proposal, it is actually a government and LDP proposal prepared with government approval. Specific plans for establishing the academy are already fairly well set. For example, the 750 million yen which the government will contribute to the total budget of 1.50 billion yen will come from the science and technology promotion coordinating expenses already allocated to the Science and Technology Agency budget.

In spite of this, the LDP will submit the bill to the Diet in the form of House member legislation. This is apparently an attempt to avoid criticism of government interference in academic independence from the Science Council and some of the opposition parties. This method of approach by the government itself indicated that the government expects the academy problem to arouse a fierce debate.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

MITI ADVISORY ORGAN STUDYING FUTURE TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] Improving Basic Research; Less Total Strength than Europe and the United States; Recommendation Expected Soon from Long-Term Policy Research Committee for Industrial Technology Development

The Long-Term Planning and Policy Research Committee for Industrial Technology Development (private advisory organ to the chairman of the Industrial Technology Council of MITI; committee chairman: Yujiro Hayashi, assistant director of the Future Technology Research Institute) is making final preparations for a recommendation report on the "ideal state of Japanese industrial technology development in the future," to be completed by the first part of October. The gist of the recommendation was announced on the 16th. According to this report, Japanese industrial technology, especially manufacturing technology, has attained a high international reputation at present, but there are many areas where funding is lacking, beginning with basic research, and our overall strength in industrial technology still lags behind the United States and Europe. Therefore it advocates the following: 1) it is necessary for private industry to have an awareness of its prime role in development and to expand its long-term research and development capability in basic and general areas; and 2) the government should prepare the environment to promote expansion of independent research and development by private industry. The report warns that if this policy is not followed, "we cannot hope for an improvement of the international competitiveness of Japanese industry as we look toward the 21st century." MITI plans to accept this recommendation when it is completed and use it in forming its future policy for industrial technology.

Private Development Capability Is the Key

The study committee made an interim report last year strongly urging the creation of the "next-generation basic industrial technology development system" which MITI began under a 10-year plan in 1981. It has offered timely advice on the state of Japanese industrial technology development, and its recommendations have been conspicuously used in steering industrial technology policy.

The present recommendation, as well as the interim report, considers the future of Japanese industrial technology from an overall point of view.

Previously, the substance of recommendations referred to the relationship between industrial research and development and economic progress, saying that improving the capability for research and development had a role in strengthening the international competitiveness of Japanese industry. Now it is saying that private research and development is the key to maintaining our comparative international strength.

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On this basis, it analyzes the Japanese research and development capability and technological level, making international comparisons, and points out that Japan is still in an inferior position in comparison with the United States and Europe, particularly the United States, in basic research and development. It also points to a lag in overall technological strength.

Therefore, the committee holds that our industrial technology development capability must be further expanded. In order to do this, it calls for a stronger coalition between government and academia, with private industry taking the main role, and for increasing private research and development spending, especially basic research spending. Along with this it advises positive use of the universities.

The report also touches on future industrial technology, pointing to miniaturization technology, information technology, and composite technology as three important trends. It says that these three areas are undeniably important as major directions in thinking in the research and development in all industrial fields and that the next-generation basic industrial technology development already started is in line with these large trends, defining them as nationally important areas of new technological development.

However, the report raises doubts about coming industrial technology development depending too heavily on the government. It emphasizes the need for private industry to be aware of its major role, selecting new research and development issues and working on them with increased research and development capability.

As a recommendation to the government, it asks the government to take the role of preparing the proper environment to promote more research and development to be performed mainly by the private sector.

MITI emphasized the need to promote original technological development in a report entitled "The Path To Building the Country on the Basis of Technology" in the "MITI Policy Vision for the 1980's: drawn up in the spring of 1980, and raised the goal of increasing the percentage of the GNP spent for research and development from approximately 2 percent at present to 2.5 percent in the mid-1980's and 3 percent by the end of the 1980's. Early on, MITI emphasized the need to formulate a vision of technological development to create a country founded on creative technology, a vision of the path which technology should follow going into the 1980's and 1990's, and a proposal of the technologies which should be emphasized. The present "recommendation" attempts to do this.

MITI plans to accept the completed recommendation in the first part of October and use it in formulating its industrial technology policies.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

FURUKAWA EXPORTS OPTICAL FIBER CABLE TO CORNING GLASS WORKS

Tokyo GEKKAN KOMPUTA DAIJESTO in Japanese 10 Oct 81 p 84

[Text] It was revealed on the 5th that a large quantity of optical fiber telephone cable has been exported to the U.S. market by Furukawa Electric Co LTD. The buyer was the world's largest glass manufacturer and the developer of the optical fiber--Corning Glass Works (headquarters in the state of New York). It is a large-scale business deal involving long-distance transmission optical fiber cables, 2,500 km in total length. Efforts to export optical fiber cable to the United States by Japan's large cable manufacturers was previously fruitless due to the barrier set up by the Corning Glass Works' patent. By establishing a supply route with the "creator" of the optical fiber, Furukawa Electric appears to have taken a great lead over other firms in the same business in developing the U.S. market.

The current export of optical fiber cables to Corning Glass Works by Furukawa Electric is believed to have been concluded in August. Although details of the business deal, such as the size of the order, have not been made clear, the optical fiber cables are believed to be of 12-strand to 48-strand construction (cables containing 12 to 48 optical fibers). These optical fiber cables will all be delivered to Canada's largest communications machine manufacturer--Northern Telecom--from Corning Glass Works.

A large quantity of optical cables will be used by Northern Telecom in its project involving application of optical communications technology to the public communications system, including telephone circuits, to be carried out in Saskatchewan Province in central Canada. Furukawa Electric's optical fiber cables will supply 80 percent of the total length of 3,200 km, or 2,500 km, of the project's cable requirement. These cables will play an important role in this optical communications network that will interconnect the telephone stations.

Corning Glass Works is the manufacturer which developed the first practical optical fiber 11 years ago. It supplies optical fibers to half the world's market excluding Japan. It is considered a "giant" in the optical communications business, similar to IBM in the computer business. This deal is the first time Corning Glass Works has purchased communications cable containing optical fibers from any Japanese manufacturer.

Corning Glass Works limits its production to optical fibers and is not considering the manufacture of cable itself. The reason Furukawa Electric was selected for the large purchase of optical fiber cable reportedly was because of Furukawa's good reputation in cable manufacturing method, including its protective membrane technology, the strength

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and quality of the construction and the overall performance. Also, since February 1977 Furukawa Electric has been the exclusive licensee in Japan of Corning Glass Works' patents concerning optical fiber construction and manufacturing method. This strong link was no doubt another reason.

Now that Furukawa Electric has made a breakthrough in exporting optical fiber cable to the United States via Corning Glass Works in the form of an "indirect export," it is believed that Furukawa Electric will be able to cultivate a U.S. market without worrying about the patent barrier posed by Corning Glass Works in the future.

At a time when the optical communications business is suddenly taking off in the United States, so that AT&T is sounding out the four large cable manufacturers in Japan, including Furukawa Electric and Sumitomo Electric, about large purchases of optical fiber cables, it is quite probable that the Furukawa Electric may make a clean sweep of them all. (Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun 6 Aug 81)

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